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Stochastic models of combat which have been proposed con-
sider that the personnel on the battlefield participate
fully
in the battle. Observation of behavior in combat
indicates
that a significant portion, of the forces involved do
not fire
their weapons. These personnel are termed dropouts and
the
drop-out phenomenon is discussed. A probabilistic model
of
combat which considers both casualty generation and the
drop-
out phenomenon is proposed. This combat model has
time var-
iable rates associated with the attrition of the opposing
sides. With the relaxation of this assumption, the
stochas-
tic combat model is shown to have an expected value
which
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SUMMARY
Post-combat interviews in World War II and Korea estab-
lish that a significant portion of the infantrymen involved
in combat fail to fire upon the enemy when it is possible to
do so. These personnel, termed dropouts, have an appreciable
effect on the attrition of forces in combat.
Assuming that the combat process is orderly and that
instantaneous rates of attrition exist, the probability of
remaining in some state for an interval of time may be devel-
oped as well as conditional transition probabilities. With
the additional assumption of the Markov property, the stochas-
tic process may be completely characterized.
When the instantaneous rates are constant, the process
has expected value which approximates Manchester's Linear
Law. The drop-out phenomenon is shown to affect the effi-
ciency (exchange ratio) parameter of Lanchester's Law.

I. INTRODUCTION
As long as conflict in human society is resolved by the
continuing application of military force, there are many rea-
sons a model of combat is desirable. In time of peace, it is
not possible to observe the combat process* In wartime, it
may be extremely costly to observe the effects of various
changes upon the process. To avoid both the expense of main-
taining an excessively large military establishment and the
losses forced by insufficient strength, force level decision
makers should have some procedure by which to predict the
effects of contemplated actions. In order to prepare for
future battles and to effectively utilize those resources
allocated to combat, a method by which future outcomes of
the process may be predicted is required by the tactician.
Non-combat experiments, such as exercises to test battle
procedures or laboratory examination of military components
,
must be related to the combat process to have military value.
Also, by abstracting the essential characteristics from the
process to form a model, the phenomena of combat may be
better understood.
Early attempts at predicting the outcomes of battle in-
cluded interpreting omens and consulting oracles by the
ancients as well as applying rules of thumb which have their
modern equivalent. For example, it is said that for conven-
tional forces to win a guerrilla (skirmishing war by small
forces of irregular soldiers behind the lines of an army)
requires a numerical superiority of ten to one (Ref . 20) , or
to conduct a successful assault requires a superiority of two
or three to one (Ref. 6)
.
In 1916, F. W. Lanchester (Ref. 15) formulated an analysis
of the effects of firepower in combat. By assuming that the
rate of attrition for a force engaged in combat depended upon
the strength of the opposition, he obtained a system of dif-
ferential equations describing the attrition of the two
forces. Many theoreticians have combined and extended the
deterministic models of Lanchester (Ref. 9)
.
During a revival of interest in Lanchester' s theory of
combat in the time of World War II, the strictly determin-
istic treatment proposed by Lanchester was modified by an-
alysts when the inherent probabilistic prooerties of the
combat process were recognized. A stochastic analysis of
Lanchester 's theory of combat was then evolved by the Opera-
tions Research Group in the Department of the Navy in which
Lanchester' s deterministic equations were considered to rep-
resent the expected value of the combat process (Ref. 7)
.
Snow (Ref. 23) and Morse and Kimball (Ref. 18) demonstrated
approximations to the Lanchester equations for the expected
value of simple, stationary, Markov combat processes.
Some investigators have examined historical information
to discover the properties of the combat process . Observa-
tion of the process is necessary to formulate the hypotheses
concerning the interdependence of events upon which a model
may be constructed.
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To verify the relationships postulated by Lanchestt
Engel examined information from the assault on Iwo Jin in
World War II. Lanchester's Square Law was shown to fit the
then available data for the battle (Ref. 11) 4 R. J. Best
analyzed later Iwo Jima data and found considerable variabil-
ity in the fraction of battalions actively engaged. Of all
the battalion days during the first twenty days , the fraction
of battalions engaged ranged from 1/3 to 11/12 except for
"day fourteen" which was a day of reorganization when no
attacks occurred. The average battalion participation was
fifty per cent. Best also found that replacement units ashore
were used initially as stevedore labor and were withheld from
the battle for some time. This analysis of the battle al ~
showed that the intensity of the combat steadily diminished
and that the Japanese weapon mix changed during the course of
the battle (Ref. 4). The findings of Best suggest that the
extremely good fit achieved by Engel was coincidental and
that the model used did not portray the process as the action
developed.
Another property observed by investigators is that few
historical battles continue to the annihilation of one of the
participants. Weiss examined casualty data from the C: /il
War and was able to formulate a stopping rule for the process.
By assuming that the probability of termination, that is,
loss, surrender, or disengagement, depends only upon frac-
tional casualties sustained up to that moment, the data was
representable by the function exp(-kf ), where f is thr
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casualty fraction and k is a constant associated with one of
two battle categories, assaults on fortified lines or meetir;
engagements. Weiss also concluded from the U.S. Civil War
data that for assaults on fortified lines, the losses of the
assaulting force were proportional to the number of defenders.
For other battles in that war, casualty ratios appeared to
have no relationship with force ratios although the probabil-
ity of winning was dependent upon force ratio (Ref . 26)
.
Weiss also examined the air action known as the Battle of
Britain in World War II. The data shows that the number of
aircraft lost was proportional to the number committed for
each side. This result does not follow from either the Lan-
chester linear law where the exchange ratio is independent of
force ratio, or the Lanchester square law where exchange ra-
tio varies inversely as force ratio. Weiss suggests that
this phenomenon of losses increasing with the number committed
is the result of nonhomogeneous forces or the law of diminish-
ing returns, that is, forces become less efficient as they
grow larger (Ref. 27)
.
Best analyzed extensive data from World War II: American,
German, British, and Russian infantry experience. In addi-
tion, he considered information about American casualties in
Korea. He found that a wide-ranging quasi-exponential distribu-
tion is typical of the daily number of battle casualties sus-
tained by individual units: companies, battalions, and
divisions. He also found that for particular companies, cas-
ualty incidence declines with time in battle for both offer
and defense (Ref. 4).
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The success of these investigators in aggregating combat
data and formulating conclusions from that data seems to in-
dicate that a mathematical model of combat has some promise
as a method for predicting future outcomes of the combat
process
.
The models of combat which have been proposed assume that
all members of the opposing sides participate actively in the
process. This thesis proposes a stochastic model which
assumes that non-fighters are present on the battle field.
Additionally, a special case of this stochastic model is
shown to have expected value which approximates Lanchester's
Linear Law. Observations of past battles have not provided
sufficient numerical data so that the parameters of these




II. THE DROP-OUT PHENOMENON
Observations of the combat process indicate that a sig-
nificant portion of the soldiers engaged are not full partic-
ipants in the battle. These individuals are expected to use
the weapons with which they are equipped and trained, and
have an opportunity for the use of the weapon, yet never fire
on the enemy. These we shall call dropouts. Although the
combat process might end in any of the following conditions
for the dropout, he is not classifiable as a deserter, pris-
oner, casualty, or psychiatric casualty. He is the
non-fighter.
After conducting post-combat interviews with approximately
400 infantry companies in both Europe and the Central Pacific
during World War II , Marshall concluded that on an average
less than 15 per cent of the survivors of the battles had ac-
tually fired at the enemy during an engagement. The best per-
formance observed was that 2 5 per cent of one company had made
at least some use of a weapon. The actions considered were,
for the most part, decisive local actions in which the company
had been hard pressed and at least 80 per cent of the men in-
volved had been in a position where it should have been pos-
sible to fire during the battle (Ref . 16)
.
The methodology used (interviews at a full assembly) makes
these figures somewhat suspect, but any bias must favor a
higher percentage of drop-outs as the men surely realized that
participation in the fight was image enhancing. Also, if a
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man had participated with a weapon in any way he was included
with the active fighters.
In a survey of 2 77 wounded combat veterans in the Eurooean
Theater of Operations in August 1944 , 65 per cent of the men
admitted having had at least one experience in combat in which
they were unable to perform adequately because of intense fear
(Ref . 24) . Although the sample is limited and adequate per-
formance is not defined, this may be another indication of
the drop-out phenomenon.
Marshall went to Korea in the winter of 1950-1951 and
used the technique of post-combat interviews at full assembly
to analyze infantry operations and weapons use. He concluded
that between 12 and 20 per cent of the men showed some ini-
tiative and that an additional 25 to 35 per cent took some
part in fire actions, for a total percentage of between 37
and 5 5 per cent actually using some weapon. In Korea, Marine
and Army units were aware of the fire factor and "anxious to
know how they stacked up against the average." During World
War II, the officers and non-commissioned officers had a gen-
eral impression that all men were participants while in Korea,
having been alerted to the problem, they often moved and
checked to assure that the men were using their weapons (Ref.
17) .
Within the American Army during World War II, it was not-
ed that the drop-out phenomenon was most prevalent among
individual riflemen. Marshall advocated equipping the reluc-
tant rifleman with the heavier weapons organic to the company
(Ref. 16). In many Korean engagements grenadiers, mortars,
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machine guns, carbines, automatic rifles, bazookas and recoil-
ess weapons exhausted available ammunition, yet no case was
found where a company's rifle ammunition was completely de-
pleted, however desperate the action (Ref . 17) . An examina-
tion of Lanchester's square law leads to the conclusion that
the increasing of manpower (concentration) gives a greater
benefit than the increasing of force efficiency. If there is
a causal relationship between the drop-out phenomenon and in-
dividual weapons efficiency, then this conclusion may not be
true.
The United States Army tacitly confirmed the drop-out
phenomenon in the Korean War by sending a research team to
the battlefield to report on the characteristics of good and
poor combat performance (Ref. 10) . Another project of the
Korean War Era, Fighter, sought a psychological testing method
to discriminate between fighters and non-fighters prior to
combat. This is another indication that the American Army
was concerned with the drop-out phenomenon.
There is a widely held idea among military men that the
use of firepower in the general area of enemy positions will
serve to reduce enemy participation in the battle. This idea
is put into action in the war in Viet Nam with the use of
harrassing and interdicting missions for artillery, flack
support for aircraft missions, and suppressive fire by infan-
try and supporting arms during assault. The idea that sup-
pressive fire decreases enemy participation in the battle
seems to support the existence of the drop-out phenomenon.
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Shellard and Welch analyzed the effect of suppressive fire
against German troops occupying open positions in three World
War II battles. These battles were an assault on Geilen-
kirschen, an assault near Wyler, and the Normandy invasion.
All attacks were against infantry positions and were charac-
terized by different amounts of fire by the Allies on various
areas under attack. The measure of the effect of the bombard-
ment was considered to be the number of attacker casualties
per defender. The data is summarized in Figure 1.
Accounts of the actions are illuminating and give insight
into the drop-out phenomenon. At those areas which received
very heavy suppressive fire at Geilenkirschen, the British
infantry found "not the slightest resistence" and attacking
troops described the defenders as "absolutely yellow colored."
German casualties were estimated to be between ten and fif-
teen per cent, yet "prisoners interrogated later were clearly
very shaken physically and said that they had felt quite over-
whelmed with a sense of helplessness in the face of immense
superiority." At other areas, German casualties were esti-
mated at five per cent, yet defenders offered little resist-
ance and expressed the same feeling of helplessness.
At Wyler, similar effects were noted although casualties
caused by the neutralizing fire were only two or three per
cent. When the suppressive fire was followed quickly by the
infantry assault, the defenders surrendered readily. However,
some of the attackers were slowed by anti-personnel mines and
others lagged behind the bombardment. Those battalions which
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G - Geilenkirschen attacks
N - Normandy attacks
W - Wyler attacks immediately
following bombardment
X - Wyler attacks slowed by
anti-personnel mines
























































.2 .3 .5 .7
Neutralization Bombardment
Equivalent Pounds of 5" AAC per square Yd.
FIGURE 1. EFFECT OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF BOMBARDMENT
ON ATTACKERS CASUALTIES
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"got well behind the shelling for one reason or another found
the enemy recovering and beginning to resist."
Shellard and Welch also showed that the data from these
battles could be described by the mathematical relationship
-5T- = AN + B(D-N) , where N is the number of effective troops,
D is the total number of troops, A is a factor associated with
the effect of the bombardment and B is a factor associated
with the ability of the defenders to again become effective
after dropping out. The data considered indicated that B,
the recovery factor, was negligible during the bombardment
(Ref . 19)
.
The historical evidence seems to support the following
conclusions: the drop-out phenomenon is a significant cause
for diminished fire power in combat and may be the most im-
portant reason for depressed volume of fire; the drop-out
phenomenon is related to the individuals weapon efficiency;
the drop-out phenomenon can be effected by battlefield pro-
cedures; and, the drop-out phenomenon is effected by the
weapons and volume of fire of the opposing forces. A model
of the combat process should, therefore, include consideration
of the drop-out phenomenon.
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III. VARIABILITY OF THE COMBAT PROCESS
Lanchester ' s equations describe the variability of the
combat process due to attrition. Some of the deterministic
extensions of Lanchester' s theory have considered other
sources of variability. For example, Schaffer considered
variability in weapon-efficiency coefficients due to the ac-
tion of ambushees in seeking cover (Ref . 21) . Stochastic
models have considered attrition to be the only variability
in the combat process.
Examination of the combat process shows that battle tires
those engaged in it. Bills notes three types of fatigue which
are present in individuals involved in combat. "Reactive
fatigue: which results from continuous performing or reac-
tion to stimuli and involves a reduced capacity to perform.
Postural or attitudinal fatigue: which results from the pro-
longed maintenance of such sensori-neuro-muscular postures
as attention, alertness, task sets, apprehensiveness , anxiety,
etc. , and involves a reduced capacity to maintain these pos-
tures or attitudes. Motivational fatigue: which is caused
by a weakening of the main drive toward the task or of sup-
porting drives, or an increase in strength of competing drives,
such as desire for rest, desire for change, escape from danger,
longing for home, sexual satisfaction, etc." (Ref. 5).
Total exhaustion in combat was investigated by Beebe and
Appel. They analyzed the susceptibility of 1000 men in rifle
companies to combat exhaustion in World War II. Significant
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statistical correlation between exhaustion and both the inten-
sity of the combat on a given day and the total number of com-
bat days in the theater was found. The data supported the
conclusion that all men are susceptible to fatigue which ren-
ders them incapable of functioning in the combat process (Ref.
3). This suggests that every individual's capability in com-
bat decreases with the intensity of the battle and the total
duration of his recent combat experience. Fatigue could be
the explanation of the decreasing casualty incidence with
time in battle noted by Best.
An experiment performed with three rifle companies in
Korea also indicated that psychophysical stress varies with
the intensity of combat. Biochemical tests on the body fluids
of the men were used to determine the physiological state.
Not only were greater changes in body state noted for the more
intense battle, the duration of the abnormal state was longer.
One company showed pronounced physiological changes for up to
three weeks (Ref. 8)
.
Marshall gives this example of stress causing a deteriora-
tion of physical capability in Korea. "Love Company started
out . . . at 7:00 in the morning, and from their assembly
point it was not more than four or five hundred yards until
they started up the ridge. This, incidentally, is a strong
company . . . from a very strong regiment, the 27th Wolfhound
Regiment. Physically the men were in good shape. The ridge
was of course very steep, but counting trail distance and not
map distance, they only had approximately 1100 yards to go up
to the point where they engaged the Chinese. The fire
21
engagement actually started around 8:30 in the morning. From
that time on until 5:00 in the afternoon, when the last Chinese
machine gun post in this center was knocked out, Love Company
was constantly engaged. As you get into the testimony of what
happened to these platoons and squads from 11:30 on, you find
the leaders, sergeants, and officers saying that their great-
est difficulty - mind you, this is in broad daylight under
mortar and intense bullet fire - their greatest difficulty
during the hours of crisis in the afternoon is that they can-
not keep their men awake. Men who are in the act of firing
will fall asleep, even though being asleep increases their
danger." (Ref. 5).
It seems reasonable that a unit can also increase its
capability to destroy the enemy during the battle. Tactics,
for example , are predominately maneuvers to change the geom-
etry associated with the combat process, so that the abil-
ities of the unit are enhanced and the power of the enemy is
reduced. During a battle, stimuli are received from the
enemy which give information about location, strength, compo-
sition, and procedures. By processing this information, a
unit can increase its battle capability. Learning during bat-
tle can also increase abilities which may account for the high
premium placed on "battle hardened" troops.
A combat model which only describes the variability of the
combat process due to attrition neglects the other sources of
variability. The evidence suggests that these sources of var-
iability may have significant effect on the combat process.
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IV. THE STOCHASTIC MODEL
Since the predominant purpose in postulating a model of
combat is the predicting of future outcomes of the process,
one object of primary interest is the probability that at
some time the process is in a given state. With the state-
ment of a criterion of termination, victory probabilities may
be found, as well as number of survivors. A state in this
model will be the 4-tuple (r,s,b,c) , where r is the number of
red casualties, s is the number of red dropouts, b is the num-
ber of blue casualties, and c is the number of blue dropouts.
At some time t A the process is in state (rA ,s Q ,b. ,c Q ) . If
m is the number of red soldiers committed to the battle and
s
n is the number of blue soldiers committed to the battle,
s
then at time t A there are m A = m - rn - s„ effective red
s
soldiers and n A = n - b A - c A effective blue soldiers.
s
Because the capability of the units involved in combat
are not constant, the probability of r - r A red casualties,
s - s A red dropouts, b - b n blue casualties and c - c A blue
dropouts in a period of length t depends not only upon t, but
also on the process time t„ at which the length t begins.
This probability will be designated by
v(t ,t;r-r ,s-s ,b-b n ,c-c )
.
Thus
v(t ,t;r-r ,s-s ,b-b A ,c-c )
is the conditional probability that during the period
(t A ,t A+t) there occur r - r A red casualties, s - s Q red
23
dropouts, b - b„ blue casualties, and c - c„ blue dropouts
given that at time t^ there were m. red effectives, s
n
red
dropouts, n_ blue effectives, and c_ blue dropouts.
For simplicity, and as Shellard and Welch found the re-
covery factor to be negligible, we shall consider that drop-
ping out is not reversible, that is, a dropout may not become
an effective while the process continues. Casualties can be
generated from the population of dropouts.
Let W (t Q ,t) = v(t Q ,t ;1 ,0 ,0 ,0) denote the probability that
during (t ,t +t) exactly one effective red unit becomes a cas-
ualty and no dropouts or blue casualties occur. Let
W
g
(t ,t) = v(t
Q
,t;0, 1,0,0)




+t) exactly one ef-
fective red unit becomes a dropout and no casualties or blue
dropouts occur. Let




denote the probability that during (t
fi
,t +t) exactly one red
dropout becomes a casualty and no dropouts or blue casualties
occur.
In a similar manner for blue, one may define:













The probability that more than one casualty or dropout




,t) = 1 - v(t
Q ,t;0, 0,0,0) - v(t Q ,t;l, 0,0,0)
- v(t
Q
,t;0, 1,0,0) - v(t ,t;l, -1,0,0)
- v(t
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Here the subscript j is associated with the probability that
a blue dropout becomes a casualty and the subscript k is asso-
ciated with the probability that a red dropout becomes a
casualty.
The resultant process will be called orderly if as t -> 0,
for any constant t
fi




This assumption is equivalent to stating that the probability
of more than one casualty or dropout occurring at the same
instant is zero.









lim f = C. (t ), i = r,s,k,b,c,j,
t+0 c 1 u
the instantaneous value of the parameter (a time rate) . Note
that the number of effective personnel and the number of droo-





,c Q ) , are implied arguments
of both the probabilities and the rates.
With these assumptions it is possible to find an expres-





casualties nor dropouts occur. For any At
_> 0,
v(t ,t+At;0,0 ,0,0) = v(t Q ,t;0, 0,0,0) v (
t
Q
+t , At ; , , , 0) . (1)
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Let I be the set of indices r,s,k,b,c,j. Then according to
the above assumptions, as At * and when t
n
and t are con-
stants
,





+t)At + o(At). (2)
Substituting (2) into (1) and rearranging terms,
v(t
Q
,t+At;0, 0,0,0) - v(t Q ,t;0, 0,0,0)
=
-v(t ,t;0, 0,0,0) I C i (t ()+t)At+o(At) .




- ^ = -v(t Q ,t;0, 0,0,0) I C i (t ()+t) ,
(whereby the existence of the right derivative is incidentally
shown) . Hence.
9{ln[v(t ,t;0, 0,0,0) ]}
= " I W^ '9t
I
and as a consequence,
ln[v(t
Q
,t;0, 0,0,0) ] - In [v(t Q , ; ,0 , , 0)
]
= ~ ll I C.(t +u)du .
Since In [v(t
fi
,0 ;0 ,0 ,0 ,0) ] is zero,
v(t
Q
,t;0, 0,0,0) = expi-/^ £ C i (t Q+u)du}.
Consider now the case when any of r,s,k,b,c,j are differ-
ent from zero. In the same manner as the preceding it follows
that as At ^ and if t
n
and t are constants,
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v(t ,t+At;r,s,b,c) = v(
t
Q ,t
;r ,s ,b ,c) v (t Q+t , At ; ,0 , , 0)
+ v(t ,t;r-l,s,b,c) v(t
Q
+t , At ; 1 ,0 , , 0)
+ v(t ,t;r,s-l,b,c)v(t +t / At;0,l,0,0)








+ v(t ,t;r,s,b,c-l) v(t
Q
+t , At ; ,0 ,0 ,1)
+ v(t ,t;r,s,b-l,c+l) v(t
Q
+t,At;0, 0,1,-1) . (3)
Now according to the assumptions the second term of each
product in the above sum can be written in terms of the rates
Since these rates are functions of the number of effectives
for red and blue, m and n respectively and of the number of
dropouts, s and c respectively, these arguments will be
stated explicitly as C
.
(t~+t ,m,n ,s ,c) . As before,
v(t Q+t,At;0, 0,0,0) = 1 - I C. (t Q+t,m,n,s,c) At + o (At)
.
The other terms become:
v(t
Q
+t,At;l, 0,0,0) = C
r
(t +t,m+l,n,s ,c) At + o(At),
v(t
Q
+t,At;0, 1,0,0) = C (t +t,m+l,n,s-l,c) At + o (At)
,
v(t




+t,At;0, 0,1,0) = Cb (t +t,m,n+l,s,c) At + o(At),
v(t
Q
+t,At;0,0,0 ,1) = C (t +t,m,n+l,s,c-l) At + o (At) , and
v(t
Q
+t,At;0, 0,1,-1) = C. (t +t,m,n,s,c+l) At + o (At)
.
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Substituting into (3) leads to the result:
9v(t Q ,t;r,s ,b,c)
^ = -v(t Q ,t;r,s,b,c) I C ± (t Q+t 7 m,n ,s ,c)






+t ,m+l ,n ,s-l ,c)
+ v(tQ ,t ;r-l ,s+l ,b,c) C, (t Q+t ,m,n,s+l , c)
+ v(t ,t;r,s ,b-l,c)Cb (t +t,m,n+l ,3,0)
+ v(t
Q
,t;r,s,b,c-l)C (t.+t ,m,n+l,s ,c-l)
+ v(t Q ,t ;r,s ,b-l ,c+l) C . (t Q+t ,m,n ,s ,c+l)
.
Given that a change of state occurs in the interval
(t Q+t ,t Q+t+At) , the conditional probability that the change





(m,n,s,c) = — 1
,
i=r , s, k ,b ,c , j . (4)
I C. (t +t,m,n,s,c)
1
These probabilities as well as the probability of no tran-




+t) suggest that Monte Carlo
techniques could be applied to approximate a solution for the
desired probabilities. Since no assumptions about the size
of the forces participating in the combat process were neces-
sary, an instantaneous rate can be associated with each in-
dividual. With the assumption that the individual rates are
stochastically independent, then the instantaneous rate for
the force is the sum of these individual rates. It seems
reasonable to consider that the rates for a population of sol-
diers had some probability distribution so that the instanta-
neous rates are random variables. In a simulation, it would
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be appropriate to sample from that population. The complexity
of the combat process implies that determination of the rates
even for an individual will be an arduous task which will re-
quire research during the combat process rather than investiga-
tion of the outcomes of historical battles.
With the restrictive assumption that the instantaneous
rates of the process do not depend on time, the probabilities
that the process is in a given state at time t can be readily
found. The transition probabilities may be computed from (4),
with C
.
(t Q+t ,m,n,s ,c) = C.(m,n,s,c). It is immediately appar-
ent that given the present state of the process, the future
states do not depend on the past which means that the process
has the Markov property.
The probability that no transitions occur in time t be-
comes
exp{-t I C . (m,n ,s ,c) } .
I
1
Consider the random variable T whose value is the length of
time during which the process remains in a given state. Then,
F(x) = Pr{T<x}
= 1 - Br{no transitions occur during time interval x}
= 1 - exp{-x J C . (m,n,s ,c) } , x 0.
I
1
The waiting time is recognized as an exponential variate and
the process is a stable, continuous time parameter Markov
process. This type of process has been explored in the litera-
ture on stochastic processes. (Ref. 2,12,13).
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The further restrictive assumption that the instantaneous











results in a stochastic process with expected values which
approximate Lanchester's Linear Law.
Consider the embedded Markov chain in this stable, con-
tinuous time parameter Markov process with parameter h,
(h=0 ,1 ,2 , . .
.
,the times at which transitions occur). The dis-
crete version of equation (3) can be written
Pr (h,r,s ,b,c) = q Pr (h-1 ,r-l ,s ,b ,c) + q Pr (h -1 ,r ,s-l ,b ,c)
+ q,Pr (h-l,r-l ,s+l ,b ,c) + q,Pr (h-1 ,r ,s ,b-l ,c)
+ q Pr (h-1 ,r,s ,b,c-l) + q .Pr (h-1 ,r ,s ,b-l ,c+l) .
The initial state is known. Furthermore, the process stops
when either antagonist's effective forces have been reduced
to zero by casualties and dropouts.
These relationships form a set of difference equations with
solution
,
, , . r-k k s+k b-j+k j-k c+j-k
V
q r qk qs qb q j qcPr(h,r,s,b,c)
-




J = h - (r+s+b+c) , for r-k ,k ,s+k ,b- j+k, j-k
and
c+j-k > 0.
From this solution we find that the expected number of
effectives which become casualties (r-k) is q h and the ex-
pected number of new dropouts in these h transition is q h.
The expected number of red effectives at the hth transition
is, therefore, m, = m -r -s Q -q h-q h and the expected number
of red effectives at the h ' th transition is
m, . = m -r r.-s A -q h ' -q h'.h ' s ^r ^s
Subtracting and dividing by Ah = h-h', we have
Am,
Air = -<V*a > -
If the number of effectives are large enough so that the
change m, is small compared with the number of effectives then
Am,h
Ah
is approximately dm/dt. In a similar manner dn/dt = - (qb+q ).







)t and n = n
Q
- (qb+qc )t.










+ qb + q c + q j
= lf (q
r
+ q s }
= E (1 "qk"q j










Integration gives the result (m-m Q ) = E(n-n fl ) , a well known
form known as Lanchester's Linear Law.
Thus the model postulated reduces to a stochastic model
with expected value which approximates Lanchester's linear
equations if very restrictive assumptions are made. These
assumptions do not appear to be justified except for battles
of very short duration.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
It has been shown that the dropout phenomenon can be and
should be considered by a model of combat. For the simple
Lanchester model of combat, the dropout phenomenon effects
the exchange ratio. As there is reason to believe that the
dropout phenomenon is not constant from battle to battle,
exchange ratios computed from historical battles should show
variability. Willard's conclusion from analyzing 1500 his-
torical land battles that the exchange ratio has controlled
the outcome of battle (Ref. 25) indicates that to predict the
outcome of the combat process, the exchange ratio must be pre-
dicted. This implies that the dropout phenomenon must first
be predicted.
An immediate result from the stochastic model with drop-
outs is combat does not proceed to the annihilation of either
side. This result is also evident in historical data (al-
though not necessarily for the same reasons) . In only two
per cent of the battles considered by Willard did the critical
casualty ratio (maximum (n_-n f )/n , (m Q -m f )/m , where the sub-
script f denotes the number at the end of the battle) exceed
one half. The annihilation of either side was used as a cri-
terion for predicting the victor of an engagement by Brown
(Ref. 7) and Morse and Kimball (Ref. 18)
.
Since the parameters of combat appear to be variable dur-
ing the process , research during the process is necessary so
that a method by which future outcomes of the ;:aocess may be
33
predicted can be developed. There is much to discover about
the debilitating effects of combat on men which seems to be
a major source of variability. Such research can only be con-
ducted during time of war.
Knowing only that the dropout is present in significant
numbers on the battlefield does not give complete knowledge
about the drop-out phenomenon, but suggests that behavior in
combat should be investigated thoroughly by trained observers
on the battlefield who have no other function. Understanding
the drop-out phenomenon should lead not only to better predic-
tive models, but also to more effective soldiers, procedures
and tactics.
The work, in this thesis represents a beginning in the
development of a stochastic model with time variable param-
eters. It is hoped that the model postulated will help to
motivate work in this area.
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